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Mitigating Myopia: 
Climate Change, Rolling Easements, and the Jersey Shore 
Kevin J. Mahoney* 
I. Introduction 
 In early October 2012, Long Beach, New Jersey’s municipal website had a peculiarly 
contentious display.  Below more typical township announcements was a list of property owners’ 
addresses written above a question, “Why won’t these homeowners sign their Easements?”1  
Further down the page were two images of contemporary homes standing on fragile cliffs of 
sand, feet from the Atlantic Ocean.  The motive of the listing was to pressure recalcitrant 
landowners into signing perpetual storm damage reduction easements allowing the State to 
periodically build and rehabilitate sand dunes on the signers’ property.2  Despite the tactic, many 
still refused to sign, fearing loss of control of their property, a drop in land value, and obstructed 
beach access, ocean views, and sea breezes.
3
   
 On October 22, 2012, a tropical depression in the Caribbean Sea strengthened into 
Tropical Storm Sandy.
4
  Sandy soon became a Category 1 Hurricane, striking the Caribbean and 
Bahamas before moving up the eastern United States as a gigantic “super storm” covering 1000 
                                                 
*  
1
 TOWNSHIP OF LONG BEACH (last visited October 20, 2012), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20121101111755/http://longbeachtownship.com/homepage.html (accessed by searching 
for Township of Long Beach in the Internet Archive index).  An easement is an “interest in land, entitling one 
person to make some use of another's property; the interest must be a property right protected against the possessor 
and others.”  Mahony v. Davis, 469 A.2d 31, 34–35 (N.J. 1983). 
2
 See Kristina Fiore, Shifting Sands, N.J. MONTHLY (May 9, 2011), 
http://njmonthly.com/articles/jerseyshore/shifting-sands.html.  
3
 Id. The purpose of the easements was to allow Long Beach Township and the State of New Jersey to, among other 
things: construct and repair dune systems, deposit sand, re-nourish the dunes periodically, and ensure public access 
to the beach under the state’s Public Trust Doctrine.  Letter from Craig R. Homesley, Chief, Civil Projects Support 
Branch, Real Estate Div., Dep’t of the Army to Dave Rosenblatt, Adm’r, Office of Eng’g and Constr., N.J. Dept. of 
Envt’l Prot. and Joseph H. Mancini, Mayor of Long Beach Twp., N.J.   (June 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.longbeachtownship.com/images/explanation_of_easements.pdf. 
4
 See Willie Drye, A Timeline of Hurricane Sandy’s Path of Destruction, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWSWATCH (Nov. 2, 
2012), http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2012/11/02/a-timeline-of-hurricane-sandys-path-of-destruction/. 
 2 
miles.
5
  At 8 PM on October 29, Sandy, since downgraded to a tropical nor’easter,6 made landfall 
at Atlantic City, New Jersey.
7
  Severe winds and flooding followed, resulting in one of the most 
catastrophic storms in U.S. history and the worst New Jersey had ever seen.
8
  More than than 
eighty-seven Americans died.
9
  And the storm is estimated to have cost New York and New 
Jersey over $7l billion.
10
   
 Coastal communities in the region were particularly devastated.  Water inundated lower 
Manhattan, shutting down significant portions of the city.
11
  In New Jersey, flooding and fire 
destroyed entire blocks of houses.
12
  In the coastal town of Mantoloking, for example, the 
Atlantic Ocean carved two inlets directly through the barrier island and wiped dozens of houses 
directly off their foundations.
13
  In nearby Seaside Heights, the town’s famous beachfront 
amusement park and boardwalk were obliterated.
14
  Even five months after the storm, the park’s 
iconic Jet Star Roller Coaster was still submerged by ocean waters.
15
 
                                                 
5
 Id. 
6
 A nor’easter is a type of cyclonic storm system made up of northeasterly winds that strike the eastern coast of 
North America.  Know the Dangers of Nor’easters, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (Feb. 
7 2013), http://www.noaa.gov/features/03_protecting/noreasters.html.  A hurricane is downgraded to a tropical 
storm when its sustained winds go below seventy-four miles per hour.  See Tropical Cyclone Climatology, National 
Weather Service, National Hurricane Center  (last visited April 2, 2013), available at 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/#bac. 
7
 Drye, supra note 4. 
8
 Id.; Stephen Stirling, Hurricane Sandy is Worst Storm in N.J. History, Experts Say, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, 
N.J.), (Oct. 31, 2012, 3:27 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/10/hurricane_sandy_is_worst_storm.html. 
9
 Eric S. Blake et al., National Hurricane Center, Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Sandy 14 (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf. 
10
 Hilary Russ, New York, New Jersey Put $71 Billion Price Tag on Sandy, REUTERS, April 22, 2013, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/27/us-storm-sandy-cost-nyc-idUSBRE8AP0SZ20121127. 
11
 Sandy Hits City with Record Flooding, Power Outages. NY1 NEWS, (Oct. 30, 2012, 9:04 AM), 
http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/171568/damage-controlsandy-hits-city-with-record-flooding--power-
outages. 
12
 Jon Huang et al., Aerial Photographs of the Damage in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 31, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/31/us/sandy-zoomers.html. 
13
 Blake et al., supra note 9, at 17. 
14
 Id. 
15
 Erin O’Neill, Go-Kart Racing a ‘Baby Step’ to Recovery: Seaside Heights’ Pier Prepares Steadily for Summer, 
The Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), April 1, 2013, at 3, available at, 
http://www.nj.com/ocean/index.ssf/2013/03/seaside_heights_casino_pier_sandy.html. 
 3 
The importance of dune protection became obvious amidst Sandy’s devastating 
aftermath.
16
  Unsurprisingly, shorelines with the largest dunes suffered the least amount of 
damage.
17
  In Mantoloking, fifty-six homes were swept away by floodwaters and another two 
hundred destroyed.
18
  Yet homes built behind nearby twenty-two-feet high, one-hundred-feet 
wide dunes suffered little, if any, damage.
19
  Overlooking the post-Sandy recovery efforts, New 
Jersey governor Chris Christie joined the fight to gain storm-protection easements on beachfront 
properties, calling landowners who still refused to sign “extraordinarily selfish and short-
sighted.”20   
After the storm, Long Beach Township mayor Michael Mancini appeared confident that 
the lessons learned from Sandy would provide him with enough leverage to leave landowners 
with no choice but to sign them.
21
  Indeed, Mancini upped the ante by enforcing a never used 
2010 town ordinance requiring beachfront owners who had not signed the storm-reduction 
easements to engineer and construct their own dunesan expensive task. 22   Without 
construction of the dunes, building permits would not be issued to the landowners.
23
  In response, 
                                                 
16
 See, e.g., Ryan Hutchins, Where No Dunes Were Built, an Unmeasurable Cost, THE STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), 
Nov. 6, 2012, at 13, available at http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/11/dune_size_determined_extent_of.html; 
MaryAnn Spoto, Dunes Were the Difference in Damage Control, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 18, 2012, 
at 12. 
17
 See, e.g., Hutchins, supra note 16, at 13. 
18
 Witnessing What’s Left of Sandy-Ravaged Mantoloking, N.J., CBSNEWYORK, (Jan. 15, 2013, 8:09 PM), 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/01/15/exclusive-witnessing-whats-left-of-sandy-ravaged-mantoloking-n-j/. 
19
 Spoto, supra note 16, at 12. 
20
 Kirk Moore, Reluctance to Sign Construction Easements in Mantoloking Jeopardizes Full Restoration, ASBURY 
PARK PRESS, Jan. 15, 2013, at A3, available at http://www.app.com/article/20130114/NJNEWS/301140114/. 
21
 See Hutchins, supra note 17 (“[Sandy] is a potential flashpoint in a long-running, long-controversial government 
effort to replenish the beaches on LBI, and a microcosm for the overall picture of beach replenishment along the 
Jersey Shore.”). 
22
 MaryAnn Spoto, Mayor: Dunes Tab is on Residents “Holdouts” on Long Beach Replenishment Plan May Have to 
Pay Before Eligible to Rebuild Home, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 26, 2012, at 3, available at 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/11/long_beach_mayor_dunes_tab_is.html.  
23
 Id.  
 4 
landowners accused Mancini of extortion and civil rights violations.
24
  Given the continued 
gridlock and heated rhetoric, litigation seems imminent.
25
 
Litigation surrounding littoral,
26
 or coastal, property is not uncommon in New Jersey.
27
  
This is because the private interests of New Jersey landowners are often at odds with those of the 
general public, who are trustees of much of the shore under the New Jersey’s Public Trust 
Doctrine.
28
  That doctrine provides that the government holds, in trust, the State’s tidal waters, 
and guarantees public access to them for recreation and economic purposes.
29
  In one recent 
conflict, for example, the New Jersey Appellate Division upheld a $375,000 judgment against a 
coastal borough because its construction of a large dune, built to preserve the beach for public 
access, obstructed the plaintiff’s ocean view.30  Some argue that that decision, now under review 
in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, incentivizes the rejection of beach protection easements by 
landowners who hope to gain a payday from the state through litigation and eminent domain.
31
 
                                                 
24
 Id. 
25
 And continued gridlock also appears likely.  Residents in other New Jersey shore towns like Mantoloking and 
Toms River have refused to sign access easements for dune replenishment. See MaryAnn Spoto, To Protect 
Property, Landowners Become Barrier to Rebuilding Dunes in Toms River, THE STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Jan. 
5, 2013, at 1, available at http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2013/01/toms_river_homeowners_slow_to.html; 
Moore, supra note 20. 
26
 Littoral is a noun meaning “[o]f or relating to the coast or shore of an ocean, sea, or lake.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
27
 See e.g., MaryAnn Spoto, In Wake of Couple’s Court Victory, Officials Review Blueprint for Beach 
Replenishment, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 13, 2012, at 13, available at 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/04/emergency_beach_replenishment.html (“[T]here have been numerous 
lawsuits contesting everything from the height of the dunes to loss of privacy to the decline in property values.”). 
28
 See e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass’n, 471 A.2d  355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (“The public trust doctrine 
acknowledges that the ownership, dominion and sovereignty over land flowed by tidal waters, which extend to the 
mean high water mark, is vested in the State in trust for the people. The public's right to use the tidal lands and water 
encompasses navigation, fishing and recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities.”); 
29
 See e.g., id.; Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s in Connecticut 
and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719, 742 (1996) (describing conflict 
between public access to beaches and private housing and industrial development in the 1960s and 70s). 
30
 Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 40 A.3d 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012), cert. granted, 40 A.3d 75 (N.J. 
2012). 
31
 See Editorial, Play Hardball on Easements, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Jan. 16, 2013, at A10, available at 
http://www.app.com/article/20130116/NJOPINION01/301160025/Editorial-Play-hardball-easements. 
 5 
One source of such conflicts is a characteristic unique to coastal and riparian property 
boundaries: they moveoften slowly, but sometimes suddenly and unexpectedly too. And 
because the public typically owns most tidal waters, but not necessarily the land abutting them, 
there is an inherent tension when the land gives way to the water, and vice-versa.
32
  Legal 
principles try to accommodate such changes, however, so as to prevent constant conflict over the 
reconfiguration of boundary lines.
 33
  Three of these principles are the doctrines of accretion, 
erosion, and avulsion.  Accretion occurs when water causes deposits to build on dry land.
34
  
Erosion occurs when land is slowly and imperceptibly lost to moving water.
35
  Finally, avulsion 
occurs when land is suddenly and perceptibly lost to water.
36
  When the sea gradually rises or 
falls and accretion or erosion occurs, title shifts with the waterline.
37
  When an avulsive event 
happens, however, the boundaries traditionally remain they way they were.
38
   
The accretion and erosion doctrines grant a degree of flexibility to boundaries adjacent to 
water by permitting property title to adapt to common, predictable changes in water 
boundaries.
39
  Similarly, the avulsion doctrine prevents the hardship that would result if such 
principles were applied to quick, unpredictable changes.
40
  In the absence of an avulsive event, 
then, courts treat the interplay between public water and private land as a type of zero-sum game: 
dynamic shoreline boundaries will sometimes eat away at private property while, in other places, 
                                                 
32
 See generally Joseph J. Kalo, North Carolina Oceanfront Property and Public Waters and Beaches: The Rights of 
Littoral Owners in the Twenty-First Century, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1427, 1438 (2005); Joseph L. Sax, The 
Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305, 306–08 (2010).  
33
 See WALLACE KAUFMAN & ORRIN H. PILKEY, THE BEACHES ARE MOVING: THE DROWNING OF AMERICA’S 
SHORELINE 12–16 (7th ed. 1998). 
34
 Phillip Wm. Lear, Accretion, Reliction, Erosion, and Avulsion: A Survey of Riparian and Littoral Title Problems, 
11 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L. 265, 265 (1991). 
35
 See id. 
36
 See id.; Sax, supra note 32, at 306. 
37
 See Sax, supra note 32, at 306. 
38
 See id. 
39
 See Wildwood Crest v. Masciarella, 240 A.2d 665, 667 (N.J. 1968)  (“The proprietor of lands having a boundary 
on the sea is obliged to accept the alteration of his boundary by the changes to which the shore is subject.” (quoting 
Ocean City Ass’n v. Shriver, 64 N.J.L. 550, 554 (N.J. 1900) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  
40
 Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and Sobs, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 19, 47–48 (2009).   
 6 
add to them in equal measure.
41
  These doctrines have a sound scientific basis, for shorelines 
generally maintain a “dynamic equilibrium”; while often shifting shape and size, they maintain a 
total “net balance” of area as a larger system of sand.42   
Global climate change will upset this equilibrium, however, by causing sea levels to rise 
and inundate the coasts.
43
  The Atlantic Coast is in a particularly precarious position because sea 
levels are rising up to four times faster than average global rates.
44
  Roughly eighty percent of 
New Jersey’s coast is considered to be highly vulnerable to flooding.45  To make matters worse, 
New Jersey’s extremely dense population already strains the environmental stability of the 
coast.
46
  Not only will planning for the future require solutions that permit beach preservation but 
it must also acknowledge that such efforts might one day be economically unfeasible and even 
unsafe.
47
  This reality requires the implementation of planning policies that permit adaptation to 
the uncertainties of climate change while allowing for at least a partial coastal retreat, if 
necessary.
48
   
                                                 
41
 See Ocean City, 64 N.J.L at 554 (“He is subject to loss by the same means that may add to his territory, and, as he 
is without remedy for his loss, so he is entitled to the gain which may arise from alluvial formations.”). 
42
 See KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 33, at 14–15 (“Despite . . . incessant motion, beaches continue to border the 
continent with about the same area from one year to the next. But like a person constantly changing position in a 
large armchair, not everything will be in the same place all the time.”). 
43
 See DAVID CLING & JAMES N. SANCHIRICO, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, AN ADAPTATION PORTFOLIO FOR THE UNITED 
STATES COASTAL AND MARINE ENVIRONMENT 14 (2009), available at, http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-Rpt-
Adaptation-KlingSanchirico.pdf; Christie, supra note 40, at 25. 
44
 Leigh Phillips, U.S. Northeast Coast is Hotspot for Rising Sea Levels, NATURE, (June 24, 2012), 
http://www.nature.com/news/us-northeast-coast-is-hotspot-for-rising-sea-levels-1.10880. 
45
 CLING & SANCHIRICO, supra note 43, at 28. 
46
 NORBERT P. PSUTY & DOUGLAS D. OFIARA, COASTAL HAZARD MANAGEMENT: LESSONS AND FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS FROM NEW JERSEY 1 (2002). 
47
 See, e.g., id. at 280 (advocating for coastal management practices focused on adapting to environmental changes 
rather than attempting to stabilize shorelines);  RAYMOND J. BURBY, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of 
Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas,  604 ANNALS OF 
THE AM. ACAD. OF POLITICAL SCI. 171, 171–91 (2006), available at 
http://www.wcu.edu/WebFiles/PDFs/Paradox_of_Disaster_Policy.pdf (describing how making hazardous areas safe 
for development in Pre-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans paradoxically decreased public safety by placing large 
populations in ecologically vulnerable locations). 
48
 See JAMES G. TITUS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ROLLING EASEMENTS 10 (2011) (defining rolling easements and 
describing how they might be implemented throughout the United States), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/type/oceb/cre/upload/rollingeasementsprimer.pdf.  
 7 
One such planning strategy is the implementation of rolling easements.  First, an 
easement is an interest in land that gives the easement holder a right to use a designated portion 
of someone else’s land for a designated and limited use. 49   For example, if A wished to 
periodically drive on B’s private road in order to gain quicker access to a local highway, A might 
pay B for an easement permitting him such access. To combat climate change and sea level rise, 
then, the government could obtain rolling easements on private littoral property.  In the event 
that the property burdened by the easement becomes permanently inundated, a rolling easement 
does not remain underwater with the land it was attached to before the inundation but, rather, 
shifts landward onto beachfront property.
50
  To reconfigure the metaphor, in one sense the 
easement does not roll at all but remains bound to the beach locale as it moves landward.   
This comment will explain why rolling easements are necessary in New Jersey and the 
problems that might arise if they are implemented.  Part II of this Comment will give a brief 
description of the New Jersey coastline and the science behind climate change and sea-level rise.  
Part III will then provide a background on rolling easements, with a focus on Texas, where the 
doctrine has had its greatest impact but has recently been repudiated by the state’s Supreme 
Court in Severance v. Patterson.
51
  Part IV will discuss the lessons New Jersey can learn from 
Severance, namely a need to fine-tune the avulsion doctrine and strike a more appropriate 
balance between private and public interests in shoreline protection and compensation. Finally, 
Part V concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
 See supra note 1. 
50
 TITUS, supra note 48, at 4. 
51
 370 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. 2012). 
 8 
II. Preserving the Shore: Past, Present, and Future 
A. The New Jersey Shore and Sea Level Rise 
The New Jersey shoreline is made up of 127 miles of barrier islands, inlets, and bays, 
among other features.
52
  New Jersey is the most densely populated state in the United States
53
 
and, unsurprisingly, the coast is crowded too, especially in the summer.
54
  Housing and 
commercial properties take up most of the state’s coastal land, the most developed in the 
country.
55
  Accordingly, the state derives most of its annual billion-dollar tourism revenue from 
its coastal counties.
56
  In coastal states like New Jersey, the enormous economic value of coastal 
property has traditionally justified beach stabilization efforts, which seek to maintain a static, 
unchanging shoreline.
57
  Increased sea levels, however, will make stabilization efforts more 
costly.
58
   
This increase is, in part, an effect of global warming.
59
  The Earth’s average temperature 
has gone up by 1.4°F over the last one hundred years and will continue to rise from 2°F to 11.5°F 
over the next century.
60
  Human activities are partly responsible for the warming of the Earth, 
namely our burning of fossil fuels, which leads to heat-trapping gases in our atmosphere.
61
  This 
warmer climate causes sea level rise because water expands when it warms and higher global 
                                                 
52
 Psuty & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 9–10.  
53
 UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010: RESIDENT POPULATION DATA: POPULATION DENSITY (2010), available at 
http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-dens-text.php. 
54
 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, NEW JERSEY: ASSESSING THE COSTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2 
(2008), available at http://www.ncsl.org/print/environ/ClimatechangeNJ.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL CONFERENCE]; 
see PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 1 (“In some locations along the shore, the summer population expands by a 
factor of five to ten or more compared with permanent winter residents.”). 
55
 PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 1.  
56
 NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 54, at 2. 
57
 See TITUS, supra note 48, at 1 (“Shore protection is common because it generally costs less than what the 
protected property is worth.”). 
58
 Id. at 30. 
59
 Id.  
60
 Climate Change Basics, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/basics (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
61
 Id. 
 9 
temperatures cause the melting of land-based ice on the poles, which consequently results in 
meltwater flowing into oceans.
62
   
Deeper seas lead not only to shoreline change but also to an increase in coastal flooding 
after storms.
63
  This is because storm surge—or the rise in normal tide levels caused by a 
storm—moves further inland when water levels are higher.64  To make matters worse for New 
Jersey, the Northeastern United States is seeing much higher sea-level rise than average.
65
  
Scientists are unsure about why this is so, but some suggest that slower circulation of water in 
the North Atlantic and the sinking of landmass in the Northeast might be the cause.
66
  The 
combination of deeper seas and stronger storm surge puts the New Jersey shore in ecological and 
economic danger.
67
  What is more, storms are getting stronger as a result of the increases in 
ocean temperatures.
68
  The New Jersey coast is particularly vulnerable to “cold-core cyclones” 
called nor’easters, which, if conditions are right, can cause even more damage than a hurricane.69  
B. Arming the Shore: Traditional Approaches 
For a layman, the problem of coastal erosion and flooding might seem easily solved.  
Why not just build a wall?  But walls have their limitations, and they have been tried before.
70
  
Even without sea level rise, coastal areas are already vulnerable to flooding and storm damage 
that result in shoreline erosion.  In fact, coastal protection in New Jersey historically focused on 
                                                 
62
 Id.  
63
 See PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 155. 
64
 NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER, STORM SURGE UNIT: INTRODUCTION TO STORM SURGE 1, available at 
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/ssurge/surge_intro.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
65
 See Michael D. Lemonick, Sea Level Rising Faster than Average in Northeastern U.S., CLIMATE CENTRAL (Oct. 
18, 2012), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/east-coast-faces-rising-seas-from-slowing-gulf-stream-15587. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Ben Horton & Ken Miller, Understanding Sea Level Rise in the Mid-Atlantic, THE JERSEY SHORELINE (2010), 
http://www.njseagrant.org/jersey-shoreline/vol26_no4/articles/understanding-sea-level-rise.html. 
68
 John Roach, Warming Oceans are Fueling Stronger Hurricanes, Study Finds, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS 
(Mar. 16 2006), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/03/0316_060316_hurricanes.html.  
69
 PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 110. 
70
 See, e.g., Orrin H. Pilkey, Op-Ed, We Need to Retreat From the Beach, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012, at A35, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/opinion/a-beachfront-retreat.html. (“As experience in New Jersey 
and elsewhere has shown, sea walls eventually cause the loss of protective beaches.”). 
 10 
stabilization or armoring methods, like seawalls, to prevent erosion.
71
  The following brief 
exploration of stabilization methods will provide not only a historical lens into traditional beach 
policies but also will show how sole focus on such methods is inadequate for dealing with sea 
level rise and how beaches function as a larger ecological system of shifting sands.  
 Shoreline armoring involves a diverse array of approaches to beach preservation. 
Generally, we can group these methods into two categories: structural “hard” approaches and 
non-structural “soft” approaches.72   
1. “Hard” Approaches 
Hard approaches use large structures that extend along the shoreline and protect the 
coastline from the effects of waves.
73
  An example of a hard approach is the fifteen-foot seawall 
built in Sea Bright and Monmouth Beach, New Jersey.
74
   The goal of a hard approach is to 
reduce the rate of shoreline loss where the structure stands—in other words, to defend a line.75  
These solutions, however, are not only short-term but also economically and ecologically 
counter-productive.
76
  Hard structures like seawalls prevent the dispersal of sand and reflect 
energy from waves.
77
  As a result, beaches get steeper as waves hit the shore with more force.
78
  
Moreover, structures like seawalls are expensive and do not last long because they are worn 
away by the relentless power of the ocean.
79
  Finally, hard structures have significant negative 
                                                 
71
 See, e.g., PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 159 (“The history of shoreline stabilization in the state is a long 
narrative of attempts to maintain a shoreline position.”). 
72
 See generally id. at 157–174. 
73
 See PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 162–63. 
74
 See id. at 41. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. at 162; see also KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 33, at 192 (“Shoreline engineering is brought into the natural 
system by the people who are responsible for creating the problems, and their solutions usually cost taxpayers more 
money than the property behind the shoreline is worth, especially since the beach is often destroyed by its 
fortification.”). 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. 
79
 PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 162. 
 11 
externalities,
80
 for they decrease the amount of sand that cycles throughout the coastal region and 
nourishes other beaches.
81
 
2. “Soft Approaches” 
Due to the shortcomings of hard methods like seawalls, today “soft” approaches are more 
common.
82
  Soft approaches often include “beach nourishment,” which involves placing sand 
from another source, usually an offshore site or inlet, onto an eroded beach or dune in order to 
counter erosion and to broaden and heighten coastal surfaces.
83
  Much like hard approaches, 
beach nourishment is also very costly.
84
  Beaches are much more complex than what one sees 
when walking along the shoreline.
85
  Scientists describe the “true beach” as “a wedge of 
sediment three or four miles wide stretching underwater to depths of thirty or forty feet.”86  
Beach nourishment consequently places sand on only a small part of the upper beach.
87
  As with 
seawalls, the result is often steeper beaches that erode more quickly than natural ones.
88
  What 
often follows after this erosion is a costly cycle of replenishment: sandfill costs hundreds of 
dollars per linear foot and replacement usually occurs every two to six years.
89
  Because of the 
cyclical nature of these projects, governments find it useful to create projects that incorporate 
periodic replenishment over a long period of time.
90
    
                                                 
80
 Externalities refer to instances where the actions of a community have deleterious effects on others and the 
community responsible for creating them ignores those effects. PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 5. 
81
 Id. at 162. 
82
 KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 33, at 192. 
83
 See PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 174–77. 
84
 Id. 
85
 See KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 33, at 216. 
86
 Id.  
87
 Id. 
88
 Id. 
89
 PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 176; see also Fiore, supra, note 2 (“Replenishment has other hidden costs. In 
Surf City, [New Jersey] the Army Corps had to pay $15.7 million for a cleanup after residents started turning up 
World War I-era munitions on the beach. These had been unexpectedly sucked up by the dredger from a borrow pit 
two miles offshore.”). 
90
 PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 176. 
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Historically, the cost of beach re-nourishment in New Jersey has been split between the 
federal government and the state, with the federal government footing sixty-five percent of the 
bill.
91
  This is an agreement actually central to the Long Beach dispute described in Part I; the 
Army Corp of Engineers refuses to push forward with the beach restoration project until storm-
reduction easements are signed by all affected properties.
92
  The dispute is emblematic of the 
forces, both natural and man-made, that influence the environmental, social, and economic 
landscape of the shoreline.   
III. Rolling Easements: A Solution 
 
The potential consequences of sea level rise and coastal erosion require forward planning, 
including a consideration of approaches that address the real possibility that continuous beach 
stabilization will one day be either impossible or economically unjustifiable.  And the 
pervasiveness of residents’ recalcitrance in granting easements to their individual municipalities 
means that a statewide approach is appropriate.
93
  Indeed, in difficult economic times, such a 
strategy is the best option.
94
  This Part will explore the use of rolling easements to address sea 
level rise.  After an explanation of useful terms, it will introduce and define the rolling easement 
concept and then discuss its implementation in other states. 
A. Essential Terms Designating Littoral Boundaries 
Before exploring rolling easements in more depth, a brief primer on essential terms used 
to describe littoral boundaries is necessary.  First, most American jurisdictions, including New 
                                                 
91
 Id. at 183.   
92
 See Fiore, supra note 2. 
93
 See, e.g., Spoto, supra note 25. 
94
 See e.g., PSUTY & OFIARA, supra note 46, at 7 (“In the absence of large subsidies from the federal government or 
the state to rebuild and defend the present shoreline position, coastal planning should shift toward managing coastal 
hazards rather than strictly coastal stabilization.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Jersey,
95
 follow the English rule in delineating the boundary between state and private lands as 
the mean high-water mark.
96
  The mean high-water mark is simply the average point at which 
tidal waters reach on a beach.
97
  On public tidal lands, data over the past 18.6 years is used to 
calculate the line.
98
  The area between the mean high-water mark and the mean low-water mark 
is typically known as the “wet beach.”99  Immediately landward of the wet beach is the “dry 
beach,” which extends from the mean high-water mark to the edge of dune grass or other plant 
life, known as the “vegetation line.”100  States use these terms to describe both boundary lines 
between public and private property as well as to structure the extent of public access to the wet 
beach.
101
  On a private beach in New Jersey, the public will own the area of the beach from the 
mean high water mark to the water while the private owner will have title to the dry beach.
102
 
B. What is a Rolling Easement? 
A rolling easement can be “a broad collection of arrangements under which human 
activities are required to yield the right of way to naturally migrating shores.”103  The most 
unique part of the instrument is that it is an interest in land that attaches to the shoreline, no 
                                                 
95
 See, e.g., Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 49 (N.J. 1972) (“The tide-flowed land lying between the 
mean high and low water marks, as well as the ocean covered land seaward thereof to the state's boundary, is owned 
by the State in fee simple . . .”). 
96
 See generally A. Dan Tarlock, RIPARIAN LANDLOCATION OF WATER BOUNDARIESBOUNDARIES OF TIDAL 
NAVIGABLE WATERS, L. OF WATER RIGHTS AND RES. § 3:35 (2012) (describing origin of state ownership of 
navigable waters in England).  Other states, such as Virginia and Massachusetts, draw the line more in favor of 
private landowners, at the mean low-water mark. Id. 
97
 See id.  
98
 See id. The figure of 18.6 years is derived from “‘theoretical considerations of an astronomical character.’” Borax 
Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 27 (1935).  
99
 See TITUS, supra note 48, at 16.  
100
 Id. 
101
 See, e.g., id. at 15–18 (describing littoral property laws in the fifty states). 
102
 See Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 119 (N.J. 2005).  Even if the dry 
beach is privately owned, “reasonable” access must be provided to the public in order to access the publicly owned 
wet beach. Id.  
103
 James Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without 
Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L . REV. 1279, 1313 (1998). 7 Md. L. Rev. 1279, 1313 
 14 
matter where it moves.
104
  But it might also be drafted to prevent harmful shoreline armoring or 
the construction of permanent structures on portions of the property.
105
   
Consider the following example.  Blackacre is beachfront property on a two-mile wide 
barrier island. The property has a house set back approximately five feet from a dune in poor 
condition.  The mean-high watermark is 150 feet from the dune.  The owner of Blackacre signs 
an easement that allows the government to enter and periodically replenish and reinforce the 
dune.  The easement also prohibits the owner of the property from building permanent structures, 
such as bulkheads or seawalls.  In return, the owner receives guaranteed continuous protection 
from beach erosion at no cost, but on one condition: that the dune line must hold a required 
minimum distance from the mean-high watermark.  If the minimum threshold is met, the 
government has the power to shift the dune landward and remove any structures that might 
prevent such movement. 
One obvious consequence of such an agreement is that it may eventually require the 
complete removal of a landowner’s home.  This concern can be assuaged for two reasons.  First, 
the easement line would shift only when the ocean is precipitously close to the dune such that 
reinforcing permanent structures likes houses is prohibitively expensive or even physically 
impossible.
106
  In such a case, a house would already be in danger of imminent damage from 
coastal flooding and storms.
107
  Second, most forecasted sea level rise will occur in the second 
half of this century, meaning that the removal of permanent structures might not occur for 
decades, if ever.
108
  Indeed, for a “typical coastal parcel, submergence by the rising sea is so 
                                                 
104
 See TITUS, supra note 48, at 23–25. 
105
 Id. 
106
 Id. at 89–90. 
107
 Id. 
108
 See Lemonic, supra note 65. 
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uncertain and far in the future that it has no practical impact on how an owner uses the land, 
whether or not there is a rolling easement.”109 
Thus, the use of rolling easements acknowledges two realities: (1) that preventing 
development altogether on valuable coastal lands is unpopular and unfeasible; and (2) that these 
lands may nevertheless one day have to be abandoned to the rising sea.
110
  Rolling easements 
accommodate this notion by fostering a “living shoreline”—one that allows coastal ecosystems 
to move inland with a rising sea while simultaneously permitting certain stabilization efforts.
111
   
1. In Practice 
 
 Recognition of sea-level rise and the need for adaptive responses to it are a part of coastal 
regulation in several states.
112
  Maine’s Coastal Sand Dune Rules113 are one example.114  They 
regulate coastal sand dune systems, which are broadly defined as “sand and gravel deposits 
within a marine beach system, including, but not limited to . . . frontal dunes, dune ridges, back 
dunes and other sand and gravel areas deposited by wave or wind action.”115  The rules restrict 
construction in any zone within an “erosion hazard area,” the definition of which is also 
appropriately broad.
116
  If any part of a dune system can reasonably be expected to become a 
coastal wetland
117
 due to shoreline change in the next century, it is an erosion hazard area.
118
  
                                                 
109
 TITUS, supra note 48, at 151. 
110
 See id. at 57. 
111
 Id. at 4–5. 
112
 See generally Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem Loss, and 
Public Access Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 572–75 (2007) (describing legislative responses 
to coastal erosion in Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Carolina, Oregon, and California). 
113
 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 355 § 3 (LEXISNEXIS 2013). 
114
 See Caldwell & Segall, supra note 112, at 572.  
115
 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 355 § 3(H). 
116
 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 355 § 3(P). 
117
 The rules define coastal wetlands as “all tidal and subtidal lands; all areas with vegetation present that is tolerant 
of salt water and occurs primarily in salt water or estuarine habitat; and any . . . contiguous lowland that is subject to 
tidal action during the highest tide level for each year in which an activity is proposed . . . .” 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 
355 § 3(I). 
118
 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 355 § 3(P). 
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Accordingly, the construction or rehabilitation of structures that prevent the movement of wind, 
water, or sand is prohibited in these locations.
119
 
 Although the term is not found within them, the rolling easement doctrine plays a 
significant role in Maine’s Coastal Sand Dune Rules.  Natural landward migration, for example, 
is an aspect of the regulations’ definition for coastal sand dune system.120  For example, the 
rules’ conditions for shoreline construction permits state that if a “shoreline recedes such that a 
coastal wetland . . . extends to any part of the structure . . . for a period of six months or more, 
then the approved structure along with appurtenant facilities must be removed and the site must 
be restored to natural conditions within one year.” 121   Maine’s coastal regulations are thus 
strikingly forward looking.  They explicitly recognize the folly of prescribing rigid guidelines for 
shoreline construction and instead put landowners on notice that their land use expectations must 
adapt to a rising sea. 
 Massachusetts and South Carolina also have legislation addressing future coastal 
erosion.
122
  The Massachusetts Code of Regulations asserts that a dune’s ability to move 
landward on retreating shorelines protects the coast from storm damage.
123
  Appropriately, the 
regulations prohibit any structure within 100 feet of a coastal dune from “interfering with the 
landward or lateral movement of the dune.”124  And South Carolina’s Beachfront Management 
Act states that both the public and private sectors have an interest in allowing the beach system 
sufficient space to “accrete and erode in its natural cycle . . . .”125  The legislation also explicitly 
                                                 
119
 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 355 § 3(J), (W). 
120
 See 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 355 § 10(A). 
121
 Id. 
122
 See Caldwell & Segall, supra note 112, at 572–75. 
123
 310 MASS. CODE. REGS §10.28(1) (2013). 
124
 Id. See also Caldwell & Segall, supra note 112, at 572. 
125
 S.C. CODE ANN. REGS §48-39-250(6) (2012); see also Caldwell, supra note 112, at 573. 
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encourages those who own permanent structures on the coast to retreat from it.
126
  Consistent 
within these states’ legislation is an acknowledgement of the vulnerability of the coast and the 
critical importance of minimally invasive strategies, and even retreat, to protect it. 
2. Severance v. Patterson 
Traditionally, however, the State of Texas applied the rolling easement doctrine “more 
forcefully and for a longer period of time than any other U.S. state.”127  The Court of Appeals of 
Texas, in Feinman v. State, first explicitly elucidated the concept.
128
  In Feinman, a hurricane 
caused a vegetation line in Galveston, Texas to shift landward onto coastal property.
129
  As a 
result, several landowners found that all or part of their land was seaward of the vegetation 
line.
130
  Because such structures inhibited the public’s access to the ocean, the Texas Attorney 
General prevented the landowners from repairing or rebuilding any structures seaward of the 
line.
131
 
The Attorney General based his authority to do so on the Texas Open Beaches Act 
(OBA).
132
  The OBA prohibits landowners from erecting permanent structures that interfere with 
the public’s access to Texas beaches.133  The law, passed in 1959, protects the public’s access to 
the shoreline up to the vegetation line in locations where the public has a right of use or an 
easement.
134
  The OBA says explicitly that any beachfront property abutting the Gulf of Mexico 
                                                 
126
 § 48-39-250(6).  
127
 Richard J. McLaughlin, Rolling Easements as a Response to Sea Level Rise in Coastal Texas: Current Status of 
the Law after Severance v. Patterson, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 365, 369 (2011).   
128
 Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); see also Richard McLaughlin, supra note 127, at 376.  
129
 Feinman, 717 S.W.2d at 107. 
130
 Id. 
131
 Id. 
132
 Id. 
133
 Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 61.012 (West 2011); Feinman, 717 S.W.2d at 718–19. 
134
 Feinman, 717 S.W.2d at 107, 111. 
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is burdened by a public access easement.
135
   The single issue presented in Feinman was whether 
or not, under the OBA, a public access easement established along a vegetation line moved 
automatically with the line after a hurricane.
136
  The court in Feinman said yes, ruling that 
although the OBA did not specifically use the phrase “rolling easement,” the concept was 
implicit in the act.
137
   
The court ruled this way for three reasons.  First, the court said that an easement’s 
purpose should withstand changes to the terrain it is attached to.  Texas case law previously 
recognized that easements alongside rivers and seas survived such changes.
138
  Second, because 
the purpose of the OBA was to protect public access beaches where the public had a right to use 
them, the easement could shrink significantly or even, as in this case, disappear.
139
  Allowing 
such a result would frustrate the OBA’s purpose of securing public access to the shoreline.140  
Finally, the court believed that allowing the easement to remain at the original vegetation line 
would be unfeasible because it would require that the boundary be determined by pure 
guesswork once that line disappeared or moved.
141
  After all, the previous dune line had been 
“obliterated” by the hurricane.142  After Feinman, Texas courts consistently held that the public 
access easement moved with the vegetation line, whether inland or towards the sea.
143
   
                                                 
135
 § 61.012 (“If the property is in close proximity to a beach fronting the Gulf of Mexico, the purchaser is hereby 
advised that the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or over the area of any public beach by 
prescription, dedication, or presumption, or has retained a right by virtue of continuous right in the public since time 
immemorial, as recognized in law and custom.”). 
136
 Feinman, 717 S.W.2d at 110. 
137
 Id.  
138
 Id. 
139
 Id. at 111. 
140
 Feinman, 717 S.W.2d at 111. 
141
 Id. 
142
 Id. at 107. 
143
 See Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 752 (Tex. 2012) (Lerhrmann, J. dissenting) (“[E]very Texas 
appellate court that has considered the issue has concluded that the public's easement on the dry beach rolls, even if 
they have not used the term ‘rolling easement.’”); see also Brannan v. State, 365 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011), 
vacated 390 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. 2013);  Arlington v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 38 S.W. 3d 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); 
see generally McLaughlin,  supra note 127, at 375. 
 19 
In 2012, however, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled that the state did not recognize the 
rolling easement doctrine.
144
  The facts of that case, Severance v. Patterson,
145
 were much like 
Feinman.  A hurricane caused the vegetation line on Galveston Island’s West Beach to move 
significantly, placing two of landowner Carol Severance’s three properties seaward of the 
vegetation line.
146
  The most seaward lot (“Lot 1”) was destroyed by the storm but was 
previously encumbered by a public use easement. The adjacent lot (“Lot 2”), now on the seaward 
side of the shifted vegetation line, was not so encumbered.
147
  The Texas Attorney General 
claimed that the easement on Lot 1 rolled landward with the vegetation line onto Lot 2.
148
  Thus, 
Severance’s house on Lot 2 interfered with the public’s use of the beach and was in violation of 
the OBA.
149
  Accordingly, the State sought removal of the house on that lot.
150
  In response, 
Severance sued state officials in federal court.
151
  Severance argued that Texas, by trying to 
enforce the easement without proving its existence on land never encumbered by an easement, 
infringed her constitutional protection against uncompensated takings.
152
 
The subsequent procedural history of Severance is complex.  Severance brought suit in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which ruled that the easement 
had indeed shifted onto Lot 2 as a result of the Hurricane.
153
  Severance appealed that ruling to 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
154
  The Fifth Circuit then certified unsettled questions of 
                                                 
144
 Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. 2012).  
145
 Id. 
146
 Id. 
147
 Id. 
148
 Id. 
149
 Id. 
150
 Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 712. 
151
 Id. 
152
 Id. at 711. 
153
 Id. at 712. 
154
 Id. 
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Texas law to the Texas Supreme Court.
155
  Those questions asked: (1) Does Texas recognize 
rolling easements?; (2) If so, does the concept derive from the OBA or the common law?; and (3) 
If a rolling easement shifts onto a lot previously unencumbered by any easement, is the 
landowner entitled to any compensation?
156
   
In response, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that in the case of an avulsive event, like a 
hurricane, easements do not shift landward with the vegetation line.
157
   The court, however, later 
granted Texas’s motion for a rehearing.158  When Severance sold the property at issue, the Court 
sent the case back to the Fifth Circuit to address whether the case was now moot.
159
  The Fifth 
Circuit ruled that it was not, and reinstated Texas’s rehearing of the certified questions at 
issue.
160
  At long last, the court finally ruled on the issue in March of 2012.
161
 
After the rehearing, the Supreme Court of Texas weighed the public’s right to beach 
access against private property owners’ right to exclude others from their property.162  In its 
analysis of the OBA, the court emphasized that the Act did not create any new property rights for 
Texans
163
 and, therefore, the State had the burden of establishing that a public access easement 
exists on any given parcel of land, as there was no evidence of a right of public use on the 
beach.
164
  Thus, the court held that, despite years of appellate courts saying otherwise, Texas did 
not recognize the rolling easement doctrine.
165
  Citing the doctrines of erosion, accretion, and 
                                                 
155
 Id.  
156
 Severance v. Patterson, 566 F. 3d 490, 504 (5th Cir. 2009).  
157
 Severance v. Patterson, 345 S.W.3d 18 (Tex. 2010) superseded by Severance, 370 S.W.3d 705.    
158
 Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 708. 
159
 Id. at 712. 
160
 Id. 
161
 Id. 
162
 Id. 
163
 Id. at 713. 
164
 See Severance, 370 S.W.3d. at 711 (“The OBA did not purport to create public easements along Texas’s ocean 
beaches, but recognized that mere pronouncements of encumbrances on private property rights are improper.”). 
165
 Id. at 721–25. 
 21 
avulsion,
166
 the court said “avulsive events such hurricanes that drastically alter pre-existing 
littoral boundaries do not have the effect of allowing a public use easement to migrate onto 
previously unencumbered property.”167   
Severance, then, rebuts the holding in Feinman that preventing an easement from shifting 
with the shoreline would frustrate the purpose of the OBA.
168
  Instead, the Severance court held 
that a public use easement could not exist in the State of Texas unless proven under the OBA or 
the common law.
169
  A newly made beachfront property such as Lot 2, then, could never be 
burdened by an easement. Since no such easement could be proven on Carol Severance’s 
property, the State could not force her to remove her property without compensating her.
170
  
Most importantly, the public use easement adjacent to the property was lost to the sea.
171
  
Justice Medina, in his dissent, argued that the majority’s erosion/avulsion distinction was 
merely an exercise in semantics, stating that if  “an easement was established over the dry beach 
before the avulsive event, it must remain over the new dry beach.”172  Joining Medina, but 
writing separately, Justice Lehrmann said that the precise metes and bounds of the original 
easement were unimportant.
173
  Instead, the critical inquiry was the “locale” and purpose of the 
easement.
174
  In this case, the purpose of the easement was access to the Gulf of Mexico and, 
                                                 
166
 See supra Part I.  
167
 725. 
168
 See id. at 724 (“In those situations, when changes occur suddenly and perceptibly to materially alter littoral 
boundaries, the land encumbered by the easement is lost to the public trust, along with the easement attached to that 
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enforce an asserted public right to use the private land.”). 
169
 Id. at 723–24. 
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 Id. at 724, 732. 
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 Id. at 726. The remaining questions were dependent on the Court stating that the state did, in fact, recognize the 
rolling easement doctrine and were not addressed by the court. Id. at 705. 
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 Id. at 725 (Medina, J. dissenting).  
173
 Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 752 (Lehrmann, J. dissenting).  
174
 Id. (Lehrmann, J. dissenting). Such reasoning is consistent with an easement created by custom, which “is not 
limited to one particular individual or the owner of a particular estate, nor is it constricted by metes and bounds. 
Instead, it attaches to a locale, in this case the dry beach.” Id. at 745 (Lehrmann, J. dissenting). 
 22 
thus, the easement was attached to the beach in that location.
175
  In addition, Justice Lehrmann 
said that the ruling would be unfair to non-littoral property owners, who obviously purchased 
property nearby the beach with the expectation that they will have access to it.
176
  That 
expectation would, of course, be in danger after Severance’s ruling that public access easements 
could disappear with a suddenly changed shoreline.   
IV. Lessons from Severance 
In considering the use of rolling easements in New Jersey, two important lessons 
concerning coastal land use and protection can be learned by reading Severance.  First, the long-
established avulsion doctrine, which New Jersey also follows, requires fine-tuning, lest it directly 
interfere, as it did in Severance, with the shifting of an established easement in the event of a 
sudden inward shoreline encroachment.  Second, as Justice Lehrmann in his Severance dissent 
noted, courts should not allow shorefront landowner’s private interests to trump the wider 
community’s interest in access, enjoyment, and preservation of the nearby beach.  These lessons, 
and the issues surrounding them, are particularly pertinent in New Jersey, because they recently 
arose in two cases in front of New Jersey courts, City of Long Branch v. Liu
177
 and Borough of 
Harvey Cedars v. Karan.
178
   
A. Lesson One: Fine-Tuning the Avulsion Doctrine   
 As stated, an avulsion is a sudden, perceptible “loss or addition to land by the action of 
water or otherwise” that is often the result of “violent shifts of land” caused by storms and 
                                                 
175
 See id. (Lehrmann, J. dissenting) (“Here, the easement provided the public with access to the Gulf and the 
associated recreational opportunities. The specific metes and bounds location of the easement is unimportant to that 
purpose; instead, proximity to the Gulf is the critical determinant of its utility and thus its location.”). 
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 Id. 
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 4 A.3d 542 (N.J. 2012). 
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 45 A. 3d 983 (2012). 
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floods.
179
  Under, the common law,
180
 Texas law,
181
 and New Jersey law,
182
 when an avulsion 
occurs, property lines do not shift and the previous mean high water mark remains as the 
dividing line between public and private property.  Avulsion is the opposite of accretion, a slow 
and imperceptible addition or reduction in land, where title shifts.
183
  Much judicial ink is 
therefore spent on deciding whether an addition or loss of land is the result of an avulsion or an 
accretion, and thus title often turns on how courts choose to interpret the innately nebulous term 
“perceptible.”184 
 Severance shows that the avulsion doctrine is likely to be viewed by some courts as 
incompatible with rolling easements. The easement at issue in Severance shifted onto 
Severance’s property after a classic avulsive event: a hurricane.185  The Court used the doctrine 
to extinguish the easement that had previously burdened Severance’s adjacent property but was 
now underwater, stating that it was “unsupported by ancient common law precepts, to hold that a 
public easement can suddenly encumber an entirely new portion of a landowner's property or a 
different landowner's property that was not previously subject to that right of use.”186   
 The Supreme Court of New Jersey itself, in City of Long Branch v. Liu,
187
 recently 
bolstered the strength of the avulsion doctrine, applying it to man-made as well as natural 
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 City of Long Branch v. Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 550 (N.J. 2012) (quoting Garret v. New Jersey, 289 A.2d. 542, 546 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972). 
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events.
188
  In that case, the coastal town of Long Branch sought to acquire a portion of the Lius’ 
land by eminent domain.
189
  The Lius contested the valuation of their property, asserting that a 
government-sponsored 225-foot extension of the dry beach in front of their home enlarged their 
property, as their deed said that their property extended to the mean high water mark.
190
  The 
court held that the man-made addition was in fact an avulsive event and, therefore, the new 
beach was state-held public land.
191
  Interestingly, Liu shows that, while the avulsion doctrine 
may frustrate rolling easement legislation, it can also preserve the fruits of the State’s restoration 
efforts by protecting newly created beaches from claims by nearby private property owners.
192
 
  The problem remains, however, that, as a result of climate change, avulsive events like 
floods and hurricanes will become more common and the doctrine could frustrate efforts to 
protect beaches.
193
  Unsurprisingly, the implications of global climate change were completely 
outside the concern of those who crafted the common law principles.
194
   As Professor Joseph 
Sax points out, at common law, littoral landowners often had a duty to protect eroding shorelines 
with seawalls.
195
  Accordingly, the doctrine of accretion served a balancing function to provide 
compensation for the burden of such duties.
196
  Today, however, seawalls are seen as detrimental 
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to the health of the shoreline and, instead, retreat is more desirable for shore preservation, no 
matter how quickly the inundation occurs.
197
   
 In the age of sea level rise, an emphasis on the perceptibility of erosive events in in 
designating littoral boundaries is therefore misplaced.  The avulsion doctrine attempts to protect 
the injustice that would occur if a landowner’s title disappeared suddenly and unexpectedly.198  
The soundness of that justification, however, weakens when severe weather events and coastal 
flooding become more frequent and predictable.  If the shoreline shifts landward because of an 
avulsion, courts should therefore be permitted, as the dissent noted in Severance, to consider the 
“locale” and purpose of the easement rather than its precise metes and bounds.199   
 In Severance, the purpose of the easement was access to the beach on the Gulf of Mexico 
and, the dissent argued, the easement should be attached to the beach as it moves inland.
200
  So 
the issue is really one of perception: the Severance court viewed the beach on Galveston Island 
as a single entity, which, once underwater, was destroyed.  When the water moved inland, 
whatever sand was in front of it was a new beach, free from the restraints on the inundated one.  
But it is doubtful that most people view beaches so rigidly.  Beaches are not static.  As such, it is 
entirely sensible to allow flexible legal devices that secure and preserve access to the beach to 
remain with it when it shifts inland.
201
 
B. Lesson Two: Balancing Interests in Obtaining Rolling Easements  
                                                 
197
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 The facts and result of Severance also show how beachfront landowners’ interests in the 
adjacent ocean are often prioritized over the similar interests of the community at large.  Justice 
Lehrmann in her dissent, for example, emphasized that the failure to recognize the rolling 
easement doctrine meant that access easements non-littoral property owners would be 
compromised.
202
  This, in turn, would result in a decrease in property and rental values because a 
prime motive for purchasing or renting a home near the shore is to access the ocean.
203
  And 
Justice Guzman noted that Texas “has long recognized the need for a balance between public and 
private use of one of the state's most valuable resources . . . .”204  This balance was upset by the 
court’s decision that the limited access the easement provided for could be hampered in the event 
of an avulsion.
205
   
 The inherent conflict between public and private coastal land use has also hampered New 
Jersey’s efforts to secure and maintain easements on coastal property.  It has done so in two 
ways.  First, as mentioned, the state has had significant difficulty obtaining easements for beach 
protection in the first place.
206
  And, second, even when it does obtain an easement to protect 
nearby beaches, the state has been subject to costly litigation and judgments when such efforts 
interfere with beachfront landowners’ property. 207   Advancing rolling easements, whether 
through a transactional or legislative/regulatory mode, then, will require a “reasoned balance” 
between a private owner’s land interests and the public’s right to shoreline protection and 
access.
208
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  Although, given the steady march of the seas, New Jersey could theoretically ensure a 
cost-effective inland migration of the shoreline by simply prohibiting beachfront landowners 
from armoring their properties from the sea.
209
  That decision would rest soundly within its 
coastal zoning authority.
210
  And the state could then itself refrain from armoring the shore.  The 
result would be a de facto rolling easement program, in which nature could run its course.
211
  The 
sea would move inland and no one would be permitted to stop it.  Individuals seeking to 
purchase or build a home or business near the shore would do so with the awareness of the risk 
they take by such actions.  Properties could be condemned by the state as the ocean proceeds 
inland and landowners could be then be duly compensated the little value left in their 
properties.
212
   
 A solution to forego all attempts to stop the shore is, for quite obvious reasons, politically 
unfeasible, especially in New Jersey.  For one, the Jersey Shore is extremely densely populated 
and therefore a decision to prohibit all beach preservation efforts could adversely affect the lives 
and safety of hundreds of thousands of people.
213
  Additionally, the shore provides an 
outstanding economic boon to the state.  In 2008, for example, the Jersey Shore earned more 
than $23 billion in tourism revenue.
214
  Finally, the Jersey Shore is so intertwined with and 
essential to the culture and identity of New Jerseyans that preventing any and all shoreline 
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armoring and then condemning properties as the shoreline encroaches is, whatever its more 
abstract merits, an admittedly outlandish suggestion.
215
   
 But the proposition is worth addressing for this reason: once New Jersey does act to 
preserve the shore it often needs to get permission from, or pay, private landowners to do so.
216
. 
The government’s frustration with noncooperation reached a particularly high point in March 
2013, when Governor Christie threatened to publicly name the individual landowners, who might 
“think their view of the Atlantic Ocean is more important than the lives and property of their 
neighbors.”217  The infamously brash governor, it seemed, had taken a page from the playbook of 
Long Beach Mayor Michael Mancini.
218
  
  And Governor Christie’s frustration, in part, likely rose from the paradox inherent in the 
conflict: aren’t beachfront owners particularly benefited from dune preservation efforts that they 
should wholeheartedly assign the state its requested easement and not expect compensation?  
The New Jersey Appellate Division recently answered “no” to that question in Borough of 
Harvey Cedars v. Karan,
219
 a case that Governor Christie’s remark above directly alludes to. 
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1. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan 
 In 1973, Harvey and Phyllis Karan built their dream house in the Borough of Harvey 
Cedars on Long Beach Island.
220
  The beachfront home had a “glass wall facing the ocean, 
oceanfront decks, and sweeping views of the beach, shoreline, and ocean.”221  A twenty-two-foot 
high dune constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers in order to ensure public access and 
enjoyment of the nearby beach eventually obstructed those views, however.
222
  And so the 
Karans sued, seeking compensation for the diminution in the value of their property as a result of 
the obstruction of their ocean view.
223
   But the State argued that because the dunes significantly 
protected the house from potential storm damage, compensation was not warranted.
224
   
 At a pre-trial hearing, an Army Corps of Engineers expert testified that, without the 
project, the Karans’ property had a fifty-six percent chance of being entirely destroyed in the 
next thirty years.
225
  The trial court nonetheless ruled that such a benefit was only a “general 
benefit” the Karans enjoyed from the project, ancillary to the Army Corp. of Engineer’s aim of 
ensuring comprehensive public access and enjoyment of the entire island’s beaches.226  Under 
New Jersey law, such are “general” benefits, enjoyed by all landowners in the area of the 
improvement, and cannot be used to reduce the compensation owed to landowner’s as a result of 
a taking.
227
  Evidence of the benefit of the dune project to the Karans’ property was therefore 
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excluded at trial.
228
  The jury subsequently awarded the Karans $375,000 to compensate for their 
lost ocean view.
229
 
 The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment because they agreed with the court below 
that the Karans received a “general” rather than a “special” benefit from the construction of the 
dune that obstructed their view.
230
  The court held that “a special benefit is a benefit particular to 
the property that is the subject of the condemnation and not the type of benefit that was the 
object of the project [i.e., general benefits].”231  Because the protection of the house was a natural 
result of the overall preservation objective of the project, the Karans gained no special benefit.
232
  
This was so even if, by virtue of the house’s location, it received more immediate protection 
from coastal flooding because of the dune’s construction.233  The court noted that the existence 
of a special benefit “is a matter of kind rather than degree.”234  As such, the benefit of the dune 
project was simply enjoyed by the Karans in a greater degree than the surrounding area and 
could not be factored into the compensation owed by the State as a result of the taking.
235
 
 Harvey Cedars is currently under review by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
236
  
Whatever its result, it provide an excellent illustration of the concept of “moral hazard.”  A moral 
hazard exists when socially undesirable behavior is encouraged by an expectation upon the 
person committing such behavior that it will go unpunished and, perhaps, even rewarded.
237
   For 
example, the damage award in Harvey Cedars was based on the diminution of the overall value 
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of the Karans’ home, which, at the time of trial, was indisputably $1.9 million.238  But how could 
a house be so valuable that, as one expert testified, had a fifty-six percent chance of being 
destroyed within thirty years if no dunes were built to protect it?
239
   There are two answers to 
that question.   
 The first is that the risk that no dunes would be built must be rather low, otherwise 
prospective homeowners would be hesitant to pay $1.9 million for home that would either (a) be 
destroyed in 30 years or (b) require expensive, and out-of-pocket, dune replenishment.
240
  So the 
paradox inherent in cases like Harvey Cedars is this: if the government did not build any beach 
dunes and the Karans’ home was either drastically reduced in value or completely destroyed, the 
Karans would not be owed a penny.  When the government does build and replenish beachfront 
dunes, however, it owes the Karans money for the decrease in the inflated value of their home, 
even though that value is inflated, in large part, because of the virtually guaranteed protective 
presence of those dunes in the first place.
241
  
 The second reason why homes like the Karans’ are so high despite their perilous 
locations is the existence of federal flood insurance.  Generally, private insurers are hesitant to 
insure catastrophic flood damage because of the high underwriting costs.
242
  In response, the 
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United States created the National Federal Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).
243
  Today, this 
program is one of the United States’ greatest domestic expenses.244  From 1978 to 2011, the 
government paid out roughly $24 billion in flood insurance claims.
245
  Unsurprisingly, the NFIP 
is now in billion of dollars of debt.
246
  Some have called for an end to the program, stating that 
beach owners who decide to live in harm’s way should bear the cost of doing so, rather than 
taxpayers. 
247
  But, like it or not, the program still exists and provides incentives and security for 
homeowners like the Karans, to build near the shore, however perilous and costly those actions 
might be to the public at large.
248
   
 Thus, Harvey Cedars illustrates the costs legislatures might face in implementing rolling 
easements.  New Jersey, however, could reduce the burden of such compensation by changing 
the ways in which juries are permitted to calculate it.  Indeed, one solution might be to statutorily 
repudiate the special benefits doctrine altogether.   
i. Repudiating the Special Benefits Doctrine 
 By repudiating the special benefits doctrine, or changing they ways those benefits are 
defined, New Jersey could reduce the amount of compensation it would owe if it were to burden 
beach property with rolling easements.  This is because juries would be permitted to offset the 
benefits of beach protection in evaluating compensation for takings claims.  After all, if Harvey 
Cedars could show that the price of the Karans’ house would have significantly diminished, that 
amount could be reduced from the $375,000 cost of the blocked ocean views.  The Appellate 
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Division addressed this possibility in a footnote in Harvey Cedars but declined to elaborate on 
whether a legislature could have constitutional authority to allow for the offsetting of general 
benefits in a takings case.
249
   
 Nevertheless, other states, such as North Carolina and California, have allowed general 
benefits to be included in the calculation of compensation for takings.
250
  And Supreme Court 
precedent dating back to the 19th century supports such rulings. In Bauman v. Ross
251
 for 
example, a statute passed by Congress provided for roadways to be built in greater District of 
Columbia.
252
  Article 11 of the law said that, in providing compensation for any land taken by 
execution of the act, the government was permitted to factor in the “antecedent” benefits 
received by nature of the condemnation.
253
  Upholding the statute as constitutional, the Court 
noted that states vary in how they factor in benefits received from a public project in considering 
just compensation.
254
  The Court, however, endorsed none of the methods, stating that the 
Constitution “contains no express prohibition against considering benefits in estimating the just 
compensation to be paid for private property taken for the public use.”255  
 In a 1919 case, McCoy v. Union Elevated Railroad Company,
256
 an elevated railroad was 
constructed directly in front of a Chicago hotel, causing injury to the property by way of smoke, 
dirt, noise, and loss of daylight.
257
  In accordance with prior Illinois cases, the jury at trial was 
instructed that, in considering damages to the plaintiff, they could not take into account any 
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general benefits the hotel received from the construction.
258
  The jury could, however, consider 
the special benefits that the plaintiff received from the existence of the railway itself.
259
  And the 
court considered an increase in market value by virtue of the presence of the railway as a special 
benefit, notwithstanding the fact that other properties within the vicinity were also so 
enhanced.
260
   
 Thus, the jury was instructed that the appropriate measure of damages was the difference 
between the fair market value of the hotel with the presence of the railway and the fair market 
value of the hotel without it.
261
  Because the presence of the railway had in fact added great value 
to the hotel by way of increased foot traffic to the surrounding area, and that increased value 
could be considered by the fact finders, the plaintiff was not awarded any damages.
262
  Quoting 
Bauman extensively, the Supreme Court affirmed, saying that it was “unable to say that 
[plaintiff] suffers deprivation of any fundamental right when a state . . . permits consideration of 
actual benefitsenhancement in market valueflowing directly from a public work, although 
all in the neighborhood receive like advantages.”263  
 McCoy is surprisingly analogous to Harvey Cedars.  But for the difference in state 
property law regarding how special benefits are defined, the result in Harvey Cedars could have 
been identical to that of McCoy.  The jury could have been instructed to consider the difference 
in market value of the Karan’s house without the dune project and with the project and factored 
compensation accordingly.  Just as the loss of daylight and increased noise could have been 
offset by the increase in value of the plaintiff’s hotel as a result of the increased foot traffic the 
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railway brought, so too could the value of the Karans’ lost ocean view be appropriately balanced 
with the significant protection that the constructed dune would provide.  
  To establish rolling easements in New Jersey, the state must revise how general and 
special benefits are defined.  If fact finders could be permitted to take into account the 
measurable benefits of such project, the state could then burden shoreline property with rolling 
easements and face less drastic judgments like the one in Harvey Cedars.  The result would be a 
more realistic and fair distribution of the economic burdens of shoreline protection.  This method 
would also be more efficient than the fact-dependent means by which Texas established rolling 
easements through the OBA.  In Severance, for example, Texas argued that the public’s right to 
access the beach at issue had always existed and, therefore, Carol Severance could not exclude 
beachgoers from her property without violating the OBA.
264
  In order to test this claim, the court 
had to delve back into Mexican law before Texas was founded.
265
  A one-size-fits-all solution, 
i.e. burdening all beachfront property with the easement, would be far more efficient.  But this 
can only be done if New Jersey alters the ways courts can calculate damages in the event of a 
taking of shore property. 
C. The Impact of Retreat 
 But still, the psychological impact of instituting new ways of thinking about shoreline 
property principles, including the use of an instrument like rolling easements, would undoubtedly 
be strong.  This is because rolling easements necessarily invoke the “R” word: retreat.  And, after 
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Sandy, New Jerseyans have expressly said that retreat is not an option.
266
  When asked about a 
potential plan to purchase homes in vulnerable coastal areas, for example, Union Beach Mayor 
Paul Smith rejected the notion, saying not one of his residents expressed a desire to give up there 
homes.  Smith said, “[w]e don’t want to buy people out. We want them to rebuild. If they have to 
build higher, they’ll build higher. We want people to stay. We don’t want them to go.”267   
 Experts, such as scientist Orrin Pilkey, proclaim that such a mentality is at best 
shortsighted and at worst madness.  In an editorial in the New York Times shortly after 
Hurricane Sandy, Professor Pilkey said that “this ‘lets come back stronger and better’ attitude, 
though empowering, is the wrong approach to the increasing hazard of living close to the rising 
sea.”268  Instead, Pilkey suggested smarter development of the shore and also the beginning of a 
retreat from the edge of the sea.
269
  
 The rolling easement doctrine might be a fitting political fix to the above viewpoints and 
an environmental crisis, however.  The doctrine would (1) permit shoreline re-nourishment; (2) 
accommodate inland migration of the shoreline if environmentally or economically necessary; 
and (3) provide notice to current and future Jersey shore landowners that awareness of 
potentially uncontainable natural forces must play a role in how they use their coastal properties.  
Neither repetitive, costly rebuilding nor complete shoreline retreat are likely feasible.  A middle 
ground, therefore, that provides a means by which landowners and governments can successfully 
adapt to a rising sea is of profound importance. 
V. Conclusion 
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 No matter what measures are taken by governments to protect the shoreline, one thing is 
for certain: sea level rise cannot be stopped.  Nonetheless, in places like the New Jersey Shore, 
long standing tradition and economics requires adaptive responses that will foster both 
preservation and retreat.  And in order to institute these responses, not only will we have to 
change the way we think about the shore but we must also alter the ways in which courts have 
viewed it as well.  This recognition will allow New Jersey to respond sensibly and pragmatically 
to the dangers of a rising sea.    
